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THE CURIOUS CASE OF LEGISLATIVE PRAYER:
TOWN OF GREECE V. GALLOWAY
Ian Bartrum*
INTRODUCTION
In Greece, New York, as in many other places around the country, the
town board begins its monthly meetings with a prayer.1 While the audience
members—including town residents and employees with matters pending
before the board—bow their heads or join in, a chosen “chaplain of the
month” delivers an invocation before the governing body’s business
begins.2 The Town has had no formal policy for selecting this chaplain, but
by regular practice, a municipal employee solicits volunteers from among
those religious groups listed in the community guide and local newspaper.
Until 2008, the list included only Christian organizations.3 And, although no
town official reviews the content of the prayers before they are delivered, a
“substantial majority” of those given have “contained uniquely Christian
language.”4 Two town residents objected to the practice in 2007, and they
filed suit when their complaints went largely unheeded.5 Eventually, the
Second Circuit concluded that the prayers “impermissibly affiliated the
town with a single creed, Christianity,”6 and in the spring of 2012 the
Supreme Court granted certiorari. Then, in a development few saw coming,
the United States filed an amicus brief in the summer of 2013—in support
of the Town.7
All of this gives rise to at least two interesting questions. First, why did
the Court choose to reconsider the question now, when it approved (for the
most part) of legislative prayer just thirty years ago in Marsh v. Chambers?8
Second, why would the Solicitor General enter into this dispute in support
of a practice that pushes the boundaries of what the Court found acceptable
in Marsh? In this Essay, I speculate that the answers to these two questions
*
Associate Professor, William S. Boyd School of Law, UNLV. Thanks to Chris Lund for insight
and comments, and to the Online editors for their hard work and guidance.
1
Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20, 22 (2d Cir. 2012).
2
Id. at 23.
3
Id. at 24.
4
Id.
5
Id. at 25.
6
Id. at 22.
7
Eyder Peralta, Obama Administration, GOP Agree on Opening Prayers Case, NPR: THE TWOWAY (Aug. 9, 2013, 11:58 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2013/08/09/210498961/obamaadministration-gop-agree-on-opening-prayers-case.
8
463 U.S. 783 (1983).
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are interrelated. The Court has taken the case, in all likelihood, because
some Justices see an opportunity to reconsider the so-called endorsement
test that now governs many Establishment Clause questions, and the
Solicitor has entered the fray to preserve that same test, even if it means that
some sectarian legislative prayers are constitutional.
I. WHY REVISIT LEGISLATIVE PRAYER?
To begin thinking about why the Court would revisit the question of
legislative prayer, it is necessary to locate Marsh within the body of
Establishment Clause doctrine. In 1980, Nebraska State Senator Ernie
Chambers challenged the state’s tradition of having a chaplain open
legislative sessions with a prayer.9 A divided Court upheld the practice for
largely historical reasons, with the caveat that the prayers must be
nonsectarian, that they not “proselytize or advance any one, or . . . disparage
any other, faith or belief.”10 In light of an “unambiguous and unbroken
history of more than 200 years”11 of legislative prayer, Chief Justice Warren
Burger created an exception to the general Establishment Clause test that he
had fashioned just a decade earlier in Lemon v. Kurtzman.12 As a result,
Marsh seems to suggest, a bit uncomfortably, that legislative prayer is
something of a constitutional anomaly. To borrow Justice Anthony
Kennedy’s phrase from oral argument in Town of Greece v. Galloway,
perhaps legislative prayer is a “historical aberration”13—born of an
unprincipled practice that seemed relatively harmless when the national
population was overwhelmingly Protestant.14 Indeed, James Madison, the
First Amendment’s primary author, labeled legislative prayer an
unconstitutional irregularity that he hoped would not distort our future
understanding of the Establishment Clause.15 Nonetheless, the anomaly has
persisted.
Despite this, and the dissenters’ hope that Marsh had “carv[ed] out an
exception to the Establishment Clause” rather than reshaped the law, the
9

Id. at 785.
Id. at 794–95.
11
Id. at 792.
12
403 U.S. 602 (1971). The three-part Lemon test asks whether state action (1) has a “secular
legislative purpose,” (2) “advances” or “inhibits” religion, or (3) excessively entangles government and
religion. Id. at 612–13.
13
Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Town of Greece v. Galloway, No. 12-696 (U.S. argued Nov. 6,
2013) [hereinafter Galloway Oral Argument], available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_
arguments/argument_transcripts/12-696_5425.pdf.
14
For an excellent account of the history of legislative chaplaincies and prayer, see Christopher C.
Lund, The Congressional Chaplaincies, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1171 (2009).
15
JAMES MADISON, Detached Memoranda, in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 745, 762–63 (Jack N.
Rakove ed., 1999). Madison called the establishment of congressional chaplaincies “a palpable violation
of equal rights, as well as of Constitutional principles,” and he hoped their “daily devotions” would not
come to be seen as a “legitimate precedent.” Id. at 763.
10
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decision could not remain entirely independent of the general Establishment
Clause doctrine.16 Since the Clause’s incorporation against the states in
Everson v. Board of Education,17 the doctrine has developed along several
axes, the most germane of which has been an ongoing debate over the
meaning of state “neutrality” in religious matters. I have argued elsewhere
that this debate has largely involved two competing visions of neutrality: an
“exclusive” vision, which would banish all religion from the public square,
and an “inclusive” vision, which would attempt to accommodate all
religious viewpoints equally.18 The Court announced the exclusive
paradigm in Everson itself—“[n]either [a state nor the federal government]
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion
over another”19—and this approach would later undergird the Lemon test.20
Perhaps the best expression of the inclusive approach came just a few years
later in Zorach v. Clauson:
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being. . . . [The state should] respect[] the religious nature of our people and
accommodate[] the public service to their spiritual needs. To hold that it may
not would be to find in the Constitution a requirement that the government
show a callous indifference to religious groups. That would be preferring those
who believe in no religion over those who do believe. 21

The theoretical divide is thus quite straightforward: exclusivists believe that
the only feasible way for the state to remain neutral is to carefully avoid all
religious speech or activity, while inclusivists contend that such an
approach actually establishes an irreligious or secular viewpoint at the
expense of all others.22
Everson, Lemon, and Zorach all addressed the relationship between
religion and public schooling, however, and the exclusive–inclusive debate
has played out somewhat differently in the context of state involvement
with religious displays.23 There the doctrine has evolved to ask whether a
display would cause a reasonable observer to view the government as
endorsing a particular religion.24 This so-called endorsement test—which
16

Marsh, 463 U.S. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947).
18
For a more thorough account of this debate, see Ian Bartrum, Of Historiography and
Constitutional Principle: Jefferson’s Reply to the Danbury Baptists, 51 J. CHURCH & ST. 102 (2009).
19
330 U.S. at 15.
20
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
21
343 U.S. 306, 313–14 (1952).
22
See Bartrum, supra note 18, at 110–13.
23
Ira Lupu has argued that the Court tends to distinguish between cases involving state religious
speech and those involving state money. See Ira C. Lupu, Government Messages and Government
Money: Santa Fe, Mitchell v. Helms, and the Arc of the Establishment Clause, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV.
771 (2001).
24
Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 596–98 (1989) (addressing holiday display that
included a crèche).
17
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has emerged out of Lemon’s second prong—is rooted in an exclusivist
vision of state neutrality, and it has thus long troubled the Court’s more
inclusivist Justices.25 Some, like Justice Antonin Scalia, would like to see it
replaced with a “coercion test,” which would ask only whether a
government practice actually coerces citizens into a specific religious
activity “by force of law and threat of penalty.”26 Justice Anthony Kennedy
would also look to coercion rather than endorsement, but would find that
coercion manifests itself in more subtle kinds of psychological pressures.27
Justice Clarence Thomas, for his part, has repeatedly suggested that the
Establishment Clause might not apply against the state governments at all.28
These objections notwithstanding, the endorsement approach has had
majority support for nearly twenty-five years,29 and so inclusivists have
focused instead on making the test sympathetic to some kinds of religious
speech or symbolism. The general thrust of this effort has been to suggest
that certain symbols or speech actually endorse a historical or secular
message rather than (or in addition to) a particularized religious viewpoint.30
Legislative prayer has drifted, rather uneasily, into the lee of these
inclusivist exceptions. Perhaps it has become a secularized act of “civic
religion”;31 or perhaps striking such prayers down at this point in our history
is just too controversial.32 But the composition of the Court has shifted in
the years since the last relevant case—possibly in favor of those who would
do away with these tenuous rationales in favor of a straight-out coercion
test.33 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, who forged and championed the
25

For a discussion of the endorsement test in these terms, see Ian Bartrum, Salazar v. Buono:
Sacred Symbolism and the Secular State, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 31 (2010), reprinted in
104 NW. U. L. REV. 1653, 1655–56 (2010).
26
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 640 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
27
Id. at 592–93 (majority opinion); see also Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 660–62 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (considering forces like peer or social
pressures potentially coercive).
28
See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 45–46 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring
in the judgment); see also Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 727 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring).
29
The notable exception is Lee v. Weisman, in which the Court applied Kennedy’s psychological
coercion test to strike down a prayer before a middle school graduation. 505 U.S. at 592–93.
30
See, e.g., Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1820 (2010) (finding Latin cross had taken on
secular meanings as a war memorial); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 687–89 (2005) (approving of
state’s recognition of “the role of God in our Nation’s heritage”).
31
The concept of civic religion is that the prayer is no longer offered for its religious content, but
for its historical and traditional significance. See generally Bartrum, supra note 25.
32
See Lee, 505 U.S. at 589 (It may be “that there has emerged in this country a civic religion, one
which is tolerated when sectarian exercises are not.”); see also Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 699 (Breyer, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (striking down a monument of the Decalogue would “tend to promote the
kind of social conflict the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid”).
33
It is certainly worth noting here that even the most demanding versions of the coercion test would
not seem to permit the legislative prayers at issue in Marsh itself, which are given by chaplains paid out
of the state coffers. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 784–85 (1983). In such cases, of course, the tax
code coerces all citizens into supporting the prayers.
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endorsement test, has retired. Her replacement, Justice Samuel Alito, has
expressed some skepticism about the approach.34 And so it is within this
uncertain doctrinal context that the Court has chosen to revisit the
problematic question of legislative prayer.
There seem to be at least two potential reasons why the Court has
decided to intervene now. The first is that Marsh has proven too difficult to
apply in practice, and thus some Justices may be ready to put the
problematic constitutional anomaly to rest once and for all. The second, and
more likely, possibility is that the Court’s inclusivists believe they finally
have the votes to do away with the endorsement test.
Although it seems unlikely that the Court would overturn Marsh now,
there are very real concerns that lend credence to the argument for striking
down legislative prayer. Nobody has done more to chronicle these
difficulties than Chris Lund, and his insights are instructive here.35 First,
Lund has observed that the nonsectarian requirement is, in itself, difficult to
define and apply in the context of legislative prayer.36 This stems in part
from the fact that prayers can never truly be nonsectarian. There will always
be someone who disagrees with the message conveyed—at the very least
atheists may take offense, as responding counsel Douglas Laycock
conceded during oral argument in Galloway37—and so the question then
becomes one of degree. The hope is for as little sectarianism as possible;
but in practice, Marsh’s blurriness inevitably opens the door to political
pressures, which predictably tend to favor majoritarian religious
viewpoints.38 It has also caused judicial uncertainty, with some courts
adopting a fairly strict nonsectarian rule while others permit prayers unless
they run afoul of Marsh’s ban on “proselytizing.”39 The long-term result of
this uncertainty is that the appropriate content of legislative prayers remains
among the most controverted church–state questions in our national life.40
Moreover, even if courts are able to delineate the precise contours of a
nonsectarian prayer, there might still be serious constitutional obstacles to
imposing such a requirement on prayer givers. In Lee v. Weisman, the Court
struck down an invocation at a middle school graduation ceremony in part
because, by distributing “Guidelines for Civic Occasions” and advising
celebrants to keep their message nonsectarian, the school principal had
“directed and controlled the content of the prayers.”41 The school had
34

See discussion infra notes 54–55.
Christopher C. Lund, Legislative Prayer and the Secret Costs of Religious Endorsements,
94 MINN. L. REV. 972 (2010).
36
See id. at 994–1013.
37
Galloway Oral Argument, supra note 13, at 31–32.
38
Lund, supra note 35, at 1039–42.
39
See id. at 1011–12 (discussing Pelphrey v. Cobb Cnty., 547 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2008)).
40
See id. at 975–76.
41
505 U.S. 577, 588 (1992).
35
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violated a “cornerstone principle”42 of the Establishment Clause by
attempting to “compose official prayers” for use at a public function.43 Lund
has called this strain of doctrine the “[c]ensorship [o]bjection,”44 and these
concerns no doubt informed the Town of Greece’s decision not to formally
review or oversee the content of their opening prayers. Indeed, at oral
argument several Justices expressed some concern that any detailed
prescription the Court could hand down in these circumstances might
present the same difficulties.45 All of this leaves Marsh’s requirement that
legislative prayers be nonsectarian, or at least nonproselytizing, in a very
precarious position: even where there is agreement on some basic premises
about the standard, courts and administrators cannot constitutionally
enforce those terms upon prayer givers. Little wonder, then, that some have
suggested that Marsh is unworkable in practice and that the Court would be
better off doing away with the anomaly of legislative prayer once and for
all.46
In truth, however, it seems very unlikely that the Court has taken this
case in order to eliminate legislative prayer. Legislative prayer is ensconced
very deeply among our national traditions, and, as Justice Elena Kagan
noted at oral argument, any effort to displace it now would open the Court
to the familiar charge of being “hostile to religion.”47 Much more likely is
the possibility that some members of the Court see the case as an
opportunity to do away with the endorsement test.
For these Justices, Marsh’s practical failings are really just the failings
of the endorsement approach writ large—it is impossible to identify what
should count as an “endorsement” of religion generally, and any effort to
decide inevitably involves the state in questions that it is incompetent to
answer. And the extreme exclusivist solution—ending the practice
altogether—would abandon neutrality in favor of an irreligious or secular
viewpoint. Thus, rather than eliminate all legislative prayers, the inclusivist
resolution is to permit virtually all prayers, so long as they are not actively
coercive. This debate is really one of constitutional first principles, and it is
worth taking a quick look at the competing ideas.48
Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test—formulated in concurrence in
Lynch v. Donnelly and adopted by the Court in Allegheny v. ACLU—is
rooted in the belief that the Establishment Clause promises Americans
42

Id.
Id. (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962)).
44
Lund, supra note 35, at 1013.
45
See Galloway Oral Argument, supra note 13, at 33–35.
46
Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 26, Town of Greece v.
Galloway, No. 12-696 (U.S. Sept. 20, 2013).
47
Galloway Oral Argument, supra note 13, at 52.
48
See Bartrum, supra note 25, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY at 35–36, reprinted in 104 NW. U. L.
REV. at 1657–58.
43
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something like a secular state.49 Perhaps akin to the French notion of laïcité,
the “secular state” view of disestablishment asserts that government should
set aside all religion in favor of secular rationales and policies.50 By
contrast, the coercion test—in either Justice Scalia’s or Justice Kennedy’s
formulation—seems to view the Establishment Clause as simply
supplementing the Free Exercise Clause in protecting individual
conceptions of religious duty against state intrusion.51 Under the “religious
duty” view, an Establishment violation arises only when the state forces us
to choose between our civic obligations and our duties to God.52 From these
divergent views emerge many of the seemingly intractable difficulties with
which the Justices wrestled in oral argument: a religious duty conception
sees efforts to police or eliminate legislative prayers as hostile towards
religion, while a secular state conception worries that the state’s imprimatur
on particular religious practices makes nonadherents feel excluded.53 It is, in
all likelihood, the contest between these basic conceptions of
disestablishment that underlies the Court’s decision to revisit legislative
prayer.
The salient question is whether a majority of the Court is, in fact, ready
to replace the endorsement test with a coercion analysis. Given previous
opinions, it is probably safe to count Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy
among those who would welcome such a change. And in Salazar v. Buono,
decided in 2010, Justice Alito made some skeptical noises about the
propriety of the endorsement test—although that case’s odd procedural
posture did not permit the Court to actually decide that question.54 It is
certainly possible that Justice Alito would do away with the endorsement
test if given the chance, and at oral argument he seemed dubious about the
practicality of imposing any nonendorsement or nonsectarian kind of
49

Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592–96 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
50
Bartrum, supra note 25, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY at 35, reprinted in 104 NW. U. L. REV. at
1657–58. The reasoning here is something like that given in John Rawls’s account of public reasoning.
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 217 (expanded ed. 2005). Laïcité is the French term for keeping
government matters among the lay people and out of the hands of the clergy. In practice, the principle
promises that the government will be secular in some sense, as opposed to the American idea that there
simply will be no official state church. See T. Jeremy Gunn, Religious Freedom and Laïcité: A
Comparison of the United States and France, 2004 BYU L. REV. 419, 419–25.
51
See Bartrum, supra note 25, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY at 35, reprinted in 104 NW. U. L.
REV. at 1657.
52
Id.
53
See, in particular, the comments of Justice Scalia, Galloway Oral Argument, supra note 13, at
40–41, Justice Kagan, id. at 52, and Justice Sotomayor, id. at 20–22.
54
130 S. Ct. 1803, 1824 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring) (“Assuming that it is appropriate to apply the
so-called ‘endorsement test,’ this test would not be violated [given these facts].”). The Court in Salazar
was asked only whether the government’s decision to sell the land on which a Latin cross stood was an
impermissible effort to evade an earlier injunction. Id. at 1815–16. Thus, the endorsement test was
already the law of the case. Id. at 1816.
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standard on legislative prayer givers.55 If Justice Alito does side with the
coercionists, it would require only one more vote to accomplish the change;
and, if we can read anything meaningful into the oral argument, that vote
might come from either Justice Kagan or Justice Roberts. Justice Kagan is a
particularly interesting possibility. In addition to voicing her worries about
appearing “hostile to religion,”56 she opened the questioning by reading one
of the more sectarian prayers given in Greece and asking counsel to
hypothesize whether he would have felt coerced to participate had the Chief
Justice asked the room to stand while it was read before arguments began.57
Taking her comments together, it could be that Justice Kagan is willing to
sign on to the coercion test, but would conclude that the Town’s practice in
Greece violates even that more deferential standard.
There are a number of observers who believe, or perhaps hope, that the
Court has taken this case for just this reason.58 Ken Klukowski forthrightly
suggested as much on the influential SCOTUSblog:
The Court should take the rule it implicitly used in Marsh—looking to
history and coercion—and hold that this is not some carve-out from the
Establishment Clause: instead, it is the correct understanding of the
Establishment Clause. Lemon and Allegheny should be overruled, and the
coercion test restored as the test the Constitution requires.59

Nevertheless, even the coercion test’s proponents acknowledge that it
presents its own share of problems. Justice Scalia, for example, expressly
acknowledged one of the test’s principal shortcomings during oral
argument:
[I]f coercion is the test . . . of the Establishment Clause, why do we need the
Establishment Clause? If there’s coercion, I assume it would violate the Free
Exercise Clause, wouldn’t it?
....
So it seems to me very unlikely that the test for the Establishment Clause is
identical to the test for the Free Exercise Clause. 60

From a textualist perspective, the coercion test threatens to make one of the
two religion clauses redundant, a significant objection to those who
55

See Galloway Oral Argument, supra note 13, at 30–33.
Id. at 52.
57
Id. at 3–5.
58
See, e.g., Steven Smith, Town of Greece v. Galloway Symposium: The End of “No
Endorsement”?, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 2, 2013, 10:37 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/ 2013/10/townof-galloway-v-greece-symposium-the-end-of-no-endorsement.
59
Ken Klukowski, Symposium: Time to Restore Longstanding Meaning—and Sanity—to the
Establishment Clause in Town of Greece v. Galloway, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 3, 2013, 3:39 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/10/symposium-time-to-restore-longstanding-meaning-and-sanity-tothe-establishment-clause-in-town-of-greece-v-galloway.
60
Galloway Oral Argument, supra note 13, at 35–36.
56
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consider themselves strict constructionists of constitutional meaning. With
that said, however, it is the possibility of exactly this sort of Establishment
Clause sea change—a move from the endorsement to the coercion
analysis—that best explains the Court’s decision to revisit Marsh and
legislative prayer.
II. WHY DID THE SOLICITOR GENERAL SUPPORT THE TOWN?
The Solicitor General’s decision to file an amicus brief in support of
the Town caught many observers off guard.61 Why, they wondered, would
the Solicitor’s office argue that the prayers at issue in Greece—most of
which adopt an identifiably Christian tone—are nonsectarian in the sense
that Marsh requires? In truth, exactly what Marsh requires is a matter of
some dispute, and it would be perfectly understandable if the Obama
Administration wanted to stay above that politicized fray. So it has to count
as somewhat of a surprise that the Solicitor would go on the record
contending that the Second Circuit erred in applying Marsh too stringently.
Indeed, it suggests that the Solicitor, too, recognizes the potential threat to
the endorsement test and has entered the case in order to give the Court
another option—preserve the endorsement test, but conclude that most
sectarian legislative prayers are permissible as a historically entrenched
exception.
The arguments advanced in the Solicitor’s brief tend to support this
theory of his involvement in the case. He is at pains to emphasize the
unique place that legislative prayer occupies in Establishment Clause
doctrine; indeed, the brief repeatedly suggests that Marsh announced a
special test that applies only to this particular, historically justified
practice.62 In this way, the Solicitor is able to argue that neither the
endorsement test nor the coercion test should apply in Galloway. Rather,
Marsh “established that the practice of providing an opportunity for a
prayer at the beginning of a legislative body’s day or session, when not
exploited to proselytize, advance, or disparage any faith or belief does not
violate the Establishment Clause.”63 If this is true, the Court would seem to
have no occasion to revisit the endorsement test, as the question simply is
not presented. Further, the Solicitor’s brief attempts to allay fears about

61
See, e.g., Christopher C. Lund, Legislative Prayer Goes Back to the Supreme Court: And This
Time the Obama Administration Is on the Side of Prayer, SLATE (Aug. 15, 2013, 3:06 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/08/the_supreme_court_will_have_
another_chance_to_decide_when_government_can.html; Nelson Tebbe & Micah Schwartzman,
Symposium: The Puzzle of Town of Greece v. Galloway, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 24, 2013, 10:20 AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/09/symposium-the-puzzle-of-town-of-greece-v-galloway.
62
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 9–16, Town of Greece v.
Galloway, No. 12-696 (U.S. Aug. 2, 2013) (repeatedly characterizing Marsh as establishing an
exception to Establishment jurisprudence).
63
Id. at 9.
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state censorship of prayer givers by suggesting that Marsh does not
“[p]ermit[] [a] [c]ourt [t]o [p]arse [t]he [s]ectarian [c]ontent [o]f
[legislative] [p]rayers.”64 While such parsing would be necessary if courts
had to apply the endorsement test, the special Marsh standard requires
much less official oversight. Thus, if the Court is willing to leave the
endorsement test alone, the Solicitor is willing to concede the
constitutionality of sectarian legislative prayers.
Ian Gershengorn’s oral argument on behalf of the United States also
evidences the intent to insulate the endorsement test by placing legislative
prayer in a doctrinal category of its own. The clearest indication of this
tactic came in a short exchange with Justice Scalia, who seemed eager to
test the Solicitor’s principles and motives. Justice Sotomayor had pressed
Gershengorn to explain why Greece’s practice was not coercive, and, after
he distinguished between prayer in legislative and quasi-judicial contexts,
Justice Scalia jumped at his opportunity:
JUSTICE SCALIA: You agree that coercion is the test, however?
MR. GERSHENGORN: We don’t agree that coercion is the test, Your
Honor.
JUSTICE SCALIA: If it is the test—
MR. GERSHENGORN: . . . [W]e think there are three pillars in Marsh:
First of all, that the history is what the Court looks to first. . . . Second, that the
Court should be very wary of parsing prayer to make sectarian judgments. And
third, what Marsh said is that adults are less susceptible [than children] to
religious doctrine—indoctrination and peer pressure.65

Gershengorn’s Marsh interpretation asks very different questions than does
the endorsement test, but—probably more importantly—the coercion test is
equally inappropriate in this context. Again, it seems the Solicitor is willing
to turn a deferential eye to the historical aberration of sectarian (but
nonproselytizing) legislative prayer if, in so doing, he can preserve the
endorsement test’s place within some larger universe of Establishment
cases.
All of this, however, leaves one glaring question largely unanswered,
and it is one Justice Sotomayor put to Gershengorn at oral argument: “And
what was the purpose of Marsh saying that proselytizing or damning
another religion would be a constitutional violation? . . . [U]nless you parse
the prayers, you can’t determine whether there’s proselytizing or
damnation.”66 That is to say, despite the government’s determined effort to
advance Marsh as an alternative approach—one that avoids the problem of
state censorship—even the more deferential proselytizing standard requires
64
65
66
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Id. at 10.
Galloway Oral Argument, supra note 13, at 23–24.
Id. at 20.
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some judicial oversight. Of course, the same problem would persist under
the coercion test, except the parsing would be for coercive language or
practices. Indeed, it would seem that the only way to truly avoid the
censorship problem is to end the practice of legislative prayer altogether.
But the Solicitor undoubtedly recognizes that, for the reasons I have offered
above, this is a very unlikely result. Better, then, to cabin the problematic
constitutional anomaly as closely as possible so that it does not undermine
the larger body of disestablishment principle.
CONCLUSION
Despite the Supreme Court’s qualified approval in 1983, legislative
prayers such as those at issue in Town of Greece v. Galloway still give rise
to some of the most difficult church–state questions alive today. In part, this
is because the tradition of opening legislative sessions with a prayer
predates the Constitutional Convention, and so—despite obvious
Establishment problems—the Court has essentially grandfathered the
practice into its constitutional doctrine. Nonetheless, there are always those
that would see the exception made into the rule, and it seems likely that at
least some members of the Court hope to use Galloway as an opportunity to
revisit the larger contours of the Establishment Clause. In particular, they
would like to replace Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test with a more
permissive and deferential coercion test. Aware of this potential threat, the
United States entered the case in order to reinforce legislative prayer’s
unique status as a constitutional aberration—one that should not guide our
general efforts to craft a coherent body of disestablishment doctrine. In this
sense, the Solicitor simply reminds us of a warning James Madison offered
nearly two centuries ago: we would do well to treat legislative prayer not as
a “legitimate precedent,” but rather, in the words of Horace, as a “few blots
carelessly spilt, or that human frailty could not avert.”67

67

This is a rough translation of Horace’s Latin, from which Madison excerpted: “maculis quas aut
incuria fudit, aut humana parum cavit natura.” MADISON, supra note 15, at 763; see HORACE, De Arte
Poetica, in HORACE: SATIRES, EPISTLES, AND ARS POETICA 450, 478–79 (H. Rushton Fairclough trans.,
Harvard Univ. Press 1942 prtg.).
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